Keynesianism and the Crisis

Lance Taylor, Guest Blogger
The only way to understand the Great Crisis and how to deal with it is through the economics of John Maynard Keynes and his closest followers. For the details see my new book, Maynard’s Revenge: The Collapse of Free Market Macroeconomics (Harvard University Press). Three ideas emphasized by Keynes 75 years ago are crucial for understanding the contemporary situation.
The first is that economic actors operate under fundamental uncertainty — at times they cannot predict or even imagine the nature of future developments. In the mid-2000s Federal Reserve Governor Ben Bernanke extolled a “Great Moderation” in macroeconomics. He did not, and probably could not, think about the tsunami that was about to strike. Rather, he accepted widespread market conventions that all was well. Keynes thought that such conventions might persist for a time, but then could rapidly break down.
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Are Keynes and Marx Compatible?*

How you view the relationship between Marx and Keynes has major political implications on how reformable capitalism is. If it is highly reformable, then it is at least possible that a long era of progressive reforms lies ahead us. For example, is it possible to achieve "full employment", or at least substantially "fuller employment", if the capitalist gobernments and the central banks adopt the kind of policies advocated by Keynes and his present-day followers?

Lea todo este interesante post. Se recomienda también revisar el excelente blog de Sam Williams.

* Muchas gracias al Dr. Alejandro Valle por el envío de la nota.

How Did Economists Get It So Wrong? *

(...) What happened to the economics profession? And where does it go from here?

As I see it, the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth. Until the Grat Depression, most economists clung to a vision of capitalism as a perfect or nearly perfect system. That vision wasn’t sustainable in the face of mass unemployment, but as memories of the Depression faded, economists fell back in love with the old, idealized vision of an economy in which rational individuals interact in perfect markets, this time gussied up with fancy equations. The renewed romance with the idealized market was, to be sure, partly a response to shifting political winds, partly a response to financial incentives. But while sabbaticals at the Hoover Institution and job opportunities on Wall Street are nothing to sneeze at, the central cause of the profession’s failure was the desire for an all-encompassing, intellectually elegant approach that also gave economists a chance to show off their mathematical prowess.

Unfortunately, this romanticized and sanitized vision of the economy led most economists to ignore all the things that can go wrong. They turned a blind eye to the limitations of human rationality that often lead to bubbles and busts; to the problems of institutions that run amok; to the imperfections of markets — especially financial markets — that can cause the economy’s operating system to undergo sudden, unpredictable crashes; and to the dangers created when regulators don’t believe in regulation.

It’s much harder to say where the economics profession goes from here. But what’s almost certain is that economists will have to learn to live with messiness. That is, they will have to acknowledge the importance of irrational and often unpredictable behavior, face up to the often idiosyncratic imperfections of markets and accept that an elegant economic “theory of everything” is a long way off. In practical terms, this will translate into more cautious policy advice — and a reduced willingness to dismantle economic safeguards in the faith that markets will solve all problems.

(...) In recent, rueful economics discussions, an all-purpose punch line has become “nobody could have predicted. . . .” It’s what you say with regard to disasters that could have been predicted, should have been predicted and actually were predicted by a few economists who were scoffed at for their pains.

Take, for example, the precipitous rise and fall of housing prices. Some economists, notably Robert Shiller, did identify the bubble and warn of painful consequences if it were to burst. Yet key policy makers failed to see the obvious. In 2004, Alan Greenspan dismissed talk of a housing bubble: “a national severe price distortion,” he declared, was “most unlikely.” Home-price increases, Ben Bernanke said in 2005, “largely reflect strong economic fundamentals.”

How did they miss the bubble? To be fair, interest rates were unusually low, possibly explaining part of the price rise. It may be that Greenspan and Bernanke also wanted to celebrate the Fed’s success in pulling the economy out of the 2001 recession; conceding that much of that success rested on the creation of a monstrous bubble would have placed a damper on the festivities.

But there was something else going on: a general belief that bubbles just don’t happen. What’s striking, when you reread Greenspan’s assurances, is that they weren’t based on evidence — they were based on the a priori assertion that there simply can’t be a bubble in housing. And the finance theorists were even more adamant on this point. In a 2007 interview, Eugene Fama, the father of the efficient-market hypothesis, declared that “the word ‘bubble’ drives me nuts,” and went on to explain why we can trust the housing market: “Housing markets are less liquid, but people are very careful when they buy houses. It’s typically the biggest investment they’re going to make, so they look around very carefully and they compare prices. The bidding process is very detailed.”

(...) So here’s what I think economists have to do...

(...) Many economists will find these changes deeply disturbing. It will be a long time, if ever, before the new, more realistic approaches to finance and macroeconomics offer the same kind of clarity, completeness and sheer beauty that characterizes the full neoclassical approach. To some economists that will be a reason to cling to neoclassicism, despite its utter failure to make sense of the greatest economic crisis in three generations. This seems, however, like a good time to recall the words of H. L. Mencken: “There is always an easy solution to every human problem — neat, plausible and wrong.”

When it comes to the all-too-human problem of recessions and depressions, economists need to abandon the neat but wrong solution of assuming that everyone is rational and markets work perfectly. The vision that emerges as the profession rethinks its foundations may not be all that clear; it certainly won’t be neat; but we can hope that it will have the virtue of being at least partly right.

Lea todo el escrito de Paul Krugman del 6 de septiembre del 2006 en el New York Times aquí

* Enviado por el Dr. Alejandro Valle, a quien agradecemos su valiosa aportación.

La crítica de Keynes al neoliberalismo

Keynes fue un decidido crítico del capitalista rentista que no aportaba nada útil a la producción y defendió las medidas destinada a controlar y mantener en un bajo nivel la tasa de interés. Justificó la condenación histórica de la usura, no sólo por razones morales que las consideraba válidas para la política económica. Sostuvo que en largo plazo, la tasa de interés debería tender a la baja a medida que el capital crecía. La política debería asegurar que así fuera, aunque esto provocara “la eutanasia del rentista” uno de los conceptos característicos de su pensamiento. En uno de sus ensayos anteriores – Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren (1930) -se planteó una idea que ha vuelto a difundirse y es “el crecimiento cero, a casi” , no como una desgracia social, sino como el fin de una carrera sin sentido por la acumulación de bienes físicos, a favor del ocio creador como objetivo de la humanidad. En cambio otra de sus propuestas “la socialización de las inversiones”, inaceptable para el capitalismo de libre mercado, llegó en algún momento a ser aceptable en cierto grado. De acuerdo con su Teoría General, el estado debe asegurar que el flujo de inversiones reales (no financieras) de una economía tenga la envergadura y la estabilidad suficiente para afianzar el volumen de ocupación plena de los trabajadores.

Lea completo "La crítica de Keynes al neoliberalismo" por José Cademartori publicado en Rebelión

Fiscal Policy: an important instrument

There has undoubtedly been a major shift within macroeconomic policy over the past two decades, from the pre-eminence of fiscal policy to that of monetary policy. The latter has gained considerably in importance as an instrument of macroeconomic policy, whereas the former is rarely mentioned in policy discussions anymore, except in the context of
limiting its use.
Fiscal policy is often discussed in a framework in which there is no issue of aggregate demand failure and in which the economy adjusts in a stable fashion toward a supply-side equilibrium. However, once it is recognized that there are failures of aggregate demand which can have lasting effects on the supply side of the economy (e.g. through effects on investment and thereby on productive capacity), fiscal policy can be seen to have an important role to play.

Lea este artículo publicado por Phillip Arestis y Malcolm Sawyer en la New School Economic Review aquí

The End of Neo-liberalism?

Neo-liberal market fundamentalism was always a political doctrine serving certain interests. It was never supported by economic theory. Nor, it should now be clear, is it supported by historical experience. Learning this lesson may be the silver lining in the cloud now hanging over the global economy.

Lea este artículo de Joseph Stilgitz aquí
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz101

A better bail out

If we design the right bailout, it won't lead to an increase in our long-term debt--we might even make a profit. But if we implement the wrong strategy, there is a serious risk that our national debt--already overburdened from a failed war and eight years of fiscal profligacy--will soar, and future living standards will be compromised.

Lea todo el artículo publicado por Joseph Stiglitz en The Nation el 26 de septiembre.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20081013/stiglitz

Economia keynesiana

En este artículo Joseph Stiglitz y Bruce Greenwald sintetizan los principales conceptos y argumentos en los que la economía derivada de las ideas de Keynes ha desembocado.

Lea el artículo completo
http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/papers/1993_New_and_Old_Keynesians.pdf