The Euro Crisis in 7 Simple Charts: They're telling you a real pack of lies

The crisis of the euro currency zone is an excellent example of how flagrant lies can successfully be converted into accepted wisdom. Almost every generalization about the crisis found in the mainstream media is false. As a result, the mainstream punditries on the crisis are ideological polemics masquerading as analysis. Further, often progressive critiques of the reactionary "austerity" policies by the euro zone governments accepts the mainstream faux-facts about the crisis, fuelling the There-Is-No-Alternative (TINA) syndrome.

(...) The common response of European progressives to this narrative it that the vast majority of Greeks, Italians, etc, have struggled long and hard for their social benefits, and it is a crime they, the majority, must pay for the greed of a tiny financial oligarchy. To put the mainstream narrative succinctly, in the European South especially, people are paid too much, work too little, receive excessive public benefits and retire too early; and progressives respond that these are legitimate rights forged in struggle.

(...) There is a problem with this diagnosis of the euro crisis. It is false on all counts, left, right and center. To begin with the most obvious lie, the retirement age for the state pension is the same for men in Germany, France and each of the PIGS, 65, though in Italy and Greece women can take the pension at 60. Pension programs allowing for earlier retirement can be found in the PIGS, and that is also true in Germany, the United Kingdom and France, where accusations of labor fecklessness do not dominate discussions of economic policy (except, perhaps, from the employer associations).

Lea todo el resto del ensayo de John Weeks aquí

The Crisis in Mainstream Economics

Despite its great technical sophistication, in its conceptual essence, mainstream economics, now argued by its proponents to be increasingly converging on agreement and uniformity, is what Joan Robinson dubbed (as early as 1964) “pre-Keynesian theory after Keynes”. Dominant figures in this transformation include Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, Robert Lucas and Eugene Fama, with Lucas and Fama currently the patron saints of Chicago and modern macroeconomics (real and financial) and macroeconomists, including Michael Woodford and John Cochrane. Now that it is put to its first really challenging test, following the period of “the great moderation”, let us examine whether its explanatory power and relevance have been found wanting.

Though there are several variants of modern macroeconomics, they all have their roots in (Irving) Fisherian Walrasian models of the process of accumulation in modern societies. In these, theconsumer queen attempting to maximise her expected life time utility is the core actor and decision-maker, with all other actors and institutions subject to her whims and desires, especially within a competitive environment.

Fisher’s basic vision and construct in theoretical terms was spelt out most fully and rigorously in the Arrow-Debreu model of general equilibrium. Subsequently, in the hands of Lucas and others, it was simplified in order to analyse the macroeconomic economy and to be the basis of stochastic general equilibrium models which at a practical level came more and more to serve policy makers in both central banks and treasuries. (At the same time Fisher’s perceptive analysis of the consequences of debt deflation has largely been ignored.)

Lea todo el resto del artículo de Geoff Harcourt aquí

¡Es la deuda privada, estúpidos! Porqué los economistas del sistema se equivocan siempre en sus diagnósticos y en sus pronósticos*

La deuda, el dinero y el propio sistema financiero no desempeñan el menor papel en los modelos económicos neoclásicos convencionales. Muchos legos creen que los economistas son expertos en dinero, pero la creencia de que el dinero es meramente "el velo que cubre el intercambio" –y que, por lo mismo, la economía puede ser modelada sin tomar en cuenta ni el dinero ni la forma en que se crea— es un dogma fundamental de la teoría económica neoclásica. Sólo los economistas disidentes toman el dinero en serio.

Lea todo el ensayo de Steve Keen traducido por Sin Permiso aquí

*NOTA: Originalmente la entrada fue subida al blog Economarx21 (blog que ampliamente se recomienda seguir) por José Sandoval.

Has Trade Liberalisation in Poor Countries Delivered the Promises Expected?

The paper reviews the evidence of the impact of trade liberalization on the economic performance of poor developing countries with respect to poverty reduction, the distribution of income within countries, the distribution of income between countries, trade and the balance of payments, and economic growth, and finds that liberalisation has not delivered the benefits expected. Economic theory, and the historical and contemporary evidence, all provide arguments for protection of industrial activities in developing countries.

Lea todo el artículo de Penélope Pachecho-López y Anthony Thirwall aquí

How Did Economists Get It So Wrong? *

(...) What happened to the economics profession? And where does it go from here?

As I see it, the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth. Until the Grat Depression, most economists clung to a vision of capitalism as a perfect or nearly perfect system. That vision wasn’t sustainable in the face of mass unemployment, but as memories of the Depression faded, economists fell back in love with the old, idealized vision of an economy in which rational individuals interact in perfect markets, this time gussied up with fancy equations. The renewed romance with the idealized market was, to be sure, partly a response to shifting political winds, partly a response to financial incentives. But while sabbaticals at the Hoover Institution and job opportunities on Wall Street are nothing to sneeze at, the central cause of the profession’s failure was the desire for an all-encompassing, intellectually elegant approach that also gave economists a chance to show off their mathematical prowess.

Unfortunately, this romanticized and sanitized vision of the economy led most economists to ignore all the things that can go wrong. They turned a blind eye to the limitations of human rationality that often lead to bubbles and busts; to the problems of institutions that run amok; to the imperfections of markets — especially financial markets — that can cause the economy’s operating system to undergo sudden, unpredictable crashes; and to the dangers created when regulators don’t believe in regulation.

It’s much harder to say where the economics profession goes from here. But what’s almost certain is that economists will have to learn to live with messiness. That is, they will have to acknowledge the importance of irrational and often unpredictable behavior, face up to the often idiosyncratic imperfections of markets and accept that an elegant economic “theory of everything” is a long way off. In practical terms, this will translate into more cautious policy advice — and a reduced willingness to dismantle economic safeguards in the faith that markets will solve all problems.

(...) In recent, rueful economics discussions, an all-purpose punch line has become “nobody could have predicted. . . .” It’s what you say with regard to disasters that could have been predicted, should have been predicted and actually were predicted by a few economists who were scoffed at for their pains.

Take, for example, the precipitous rise and fall of housing prices. Some economists, notably Robert Shiller, did identify the bubble and warn of painful consequences if it were to burst. Yet key policy makers failed to see the obvious. In 2004, Alan Greenspan dismissed talk of a housing bubble: “a national severe price distortion,” he declared, was “most unlikely.” Home-price increases, Ben Bernanke said in 2005, “largely reflect strong economic fundamentals.”

How did they miss the bubble? To be fair, interest rates were unusually low, possibly explaining part of the price rise. It may be that Greenspan and Bernanke also wanted to celebrate the Fed’s success in pulling the economy out of the 2001 recession; conceding that much of that success rested on the creation of a monstrous bubble would have placed a damper on the festivities.

But there was something else going on: a general belief that bubbles just don’t happen. What’s striking, when you reread Greenspan’s assurances, is that they weren’t based on evidence — they were based on the a priori assertion that there simply can’t be a bubble in housing. And the finance theorists were even more adamant on this point. In a 2007 interview, Eugene Fama, the father of the efficient-market hypothesis, declared that “the word ‘bubble’ drives me nuts,” and went on to explain why we can trust the housing market: “Housing markets are less liquid, but people are very careful when they buy houses. It’s typically the biggest investment they’re going to make, so they look around very carefully and they compare prices. The bidding process is very detailed.”

(...) So here’s what I think economists have to do...

(...) Many economists will find these changes deeply disturbing. It will be a long time, if ever, before the new, more realistic approaches to finance and macroeconomics offer the same kind of clarity, completeness and sheer beauty that characterizes the full neoclassical approach. To some economists that will be a reason to cling to neoclassicism, despite its utter failure to make sense of the greatest economic crisis in three generations. This seems, however, like a good time to recall the words of H. L. Mencken: “There is always an easy solution to every human problem — neat, plausible and wrong.”

When it comes to the all-too-human problem of recessions and depressions, economists need to abandon the neat but wrong solution of assuming that everyone is rational and markets work perfectly. The vision that emerges as the profession rethinks its foundations may not be all that clear; it certainly won’t be neat; but we can hope that it will have the virtue of being at least partly right.

Lea todo el escrito de Paul Krugman del 6 de septiembre del 2006 en el New York Times aquí

* Enviado por el Dr. Alejandro Valle, a quien agradecemos su valiosa aportación.

Why capitalism fails; the man who saw the meltdown coming had another troubling insight: it will happen again

Since the global financial system started unraveling in dramatic fashion two years ago, distinguished economists have suffered a crisis of their own. Ivy League professors who had trumpeted the dawn of a new era of stability have scrambled to explain how, exactly, the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression had ambushed their entire profession.

Amid the hand-wringing and the self-flagellation, a few more cerebral commentators started to speak about the arrival of a “Minsky moment,” and a growing number of insiders began to warn of a coming “Minsky meltdown.”

“Minsky” was shorthand for Hyman Minsky, a hitherto obscure macroeconomist who died over a decade ago. Many economists had never heard of him when the crisis struck, and he remains a shadowy figure in the profession. But lately he has begun emerging as perhaps the most prescient big-picture thinker about what, exactly, we are going through. A contrarian amid the conformity of postwar America, an expert in the then-unfashionable subfields of finance and crisis, Minsky was one economist who saw what was coming. He predicted, decades ago, almost exactly the kind of meltdown that recently hammered the global economy.

Lea todo el ensayo de Stephen Mihm en la página del Levy Institute aquí

Meltdown! A socialist view of the capitalist crisis *

Este es un muy buen compendio de artículos y entrevistas a economistas de renombre en el mundo de la izquierda, publicado en Australia por Resistance Books en el presente año.

Se encuentra conformado por ensayos de personas de altísimo nivel como Tony Iltis, Lee Sustar, John Bellamy Foster, Phil Hearse, Adam Hanieh y Dave Holmes.

Puede descargarse sin ningún problema aquí

* Muchas gracias a Ulises quien me envío la entrada

FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT IN THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

There is, in the left academy, a rather broad agreement concerning the nature of the new phase of capitalism asserted since the early 1980s, commonly referred to as neoliberalism. Central to this contemporary economy is the preeminence of financial institutions and mechanisms, domestically and internationally: the new discipline imposed on labor and management, macro policies targeted to price stability, and the opening of frontiers to trade and capital movements, etc. Although it is a multifaceted phenomenon, it is possible to date neoliberalism from the end of the 1970s, when the Federal Reserve, chaired by Paul Volcker, decided to increase interest rates at any level supposedly required to curb ination (what we denote as the "1979 coup").

We agree with this general framework of analysis, but we also believe it often lacks a clear, explicit, reference to social relations. The paper is, actually, a bold attempt at assessing both contemporary trends in capitalism and the perspectives now opened for the 21st century, in a framework whose main focus is on classes, and the interplay of class relations and struggles.

Abstracting from traditional petty proprietaries, class patterns can be summarized as follows: (1) Capitalist owners; (2) Managers (in a broad sense of the term including officials); (3) Clerical workers; and (4) Production workers. In addition to smaller capitalists, managers and clerical workers shaped what has been denoted as "new middle classes".

(...) The transformation of income composition is telling. Before World War II, interest, dividends, and rent, accounted for about half of the income of the traditional capitalist class. The recovery during the latter decades was due to (1) "wages", and (2) income from sole proprietors, partnership, and S-corporations. (An important fraction of "wages" corresponds to the distribution of shares.) These are incomes from tax returns, and it is obviously impossible to determine how much capital income is undeclared. The importance of tax shelters has been growing considerably during those neoliberal years. But the rise of the other categories of incomes remains unquestionable.

Lea todo el artículo de Gèrard Duménil y Dominique Lèvy donde se realiza un buen análisis tanto gráfico como de los datos observados para tratar de analizar las trayectorias de la participaciones de los ingresos en EUA y Francia aquí

Marxists on the capitalist crisis. The Imbalances in the System are Unsustainable

Trevor Evans is a professor at the Berlin School of Economics, and has also worked in Nicaragua and other countries. He has written especially on the interrelation between finance and capitalist crises. He spoke to Martin Thomas.
(...) The process of liberalisation of the financial sector created the basis on which all sorts of innovations could develop, and resulted in a huge expansion in the size of the financial sector relative to industrial and commercial capital.

(...) The crisis which broke in August 2007 was the end of the third of the waves of expansion, since the early 1980s, which have been closely linked to the process of financial liberalisation.
The housing credits were mainly then sold on, by grouping large numbers of mortgages as bonds that could be traded. Those bonds were in turn transformed into other bonds which could get more attractive ratings. It appeared that the big banks were selling the bonds on, but what became clear last summer was that many of them were also holding some of the new bonds themselves, not on their own books, but in off-balance-sheet vehicles to get round all the international rules on capital requirements [i.e. rules which say that banks must have a certain stash of cash, of their own, to underpin their operations].

When the central bank sets a low interest rate, the financial sector goes searching for leverage. That means that if things go well, they get high returns; the moment things go wrong, the leverage goes into reverse, and they make huge losses.
a way out?
(...) The Fed has now pushed its interest rate very low. That will relieve the pressure on some of the financial institutions under stress.
But the traditional channels by which central bank monetary policy operate are running into problems. In the advanced capitalist countries, the main way that monetary policy operates is that the central bank buys bonds and thus provides central bank money to the inter-bank money market. Usually the central bank has a target for the interest rate in the inter-bank money market, and then banks in turn charge an interest rate which is a mark-up on that inter-bank rate for their outside lending.

Lea todo el texto y la entrevista a Trevor Evans en Worker´s Liberty

Global downturn: In graphics

The US Bank bail-out package


Economies hit. World economic growth is expected to slow sharply, with the UK among the hardest hit. Developing countries such as China and India should fare better.


Legacy of debt. As countries try to spend their way out of recession, debt levels are forecast to rise.


Victims. The financial landscape has changed dramatically, with several giants of the business world disappearing.


Billion dollar stimulous package

Vea todas las demás imágenes aquí

La jornada laboral capitalista y la jornada laboral socialista

A medida que el primero de mayo se acerca, vale la pena recordar cuatro aspectos sobre ese día:

1. Para los trabajadores el primero de mayo no es la celebración de un día feriado estatal, ni un regalo de él, sino que conmemorara la lucha —desde abajo— de los trabajadores.

2. Inicialmente, el primero de mayo se centraba en la lucha por una jornada laboral mas corta.

3. La lucha para una jornada laboral mas corta no es una lucha aislada sino la lucha contra la explotación capitalista.

4. La lucha contra la explotación capitalista es una parte esencial pero no es la única parte de la lucha general contra el capitalismo.

(...) ¿Cual es la relación entre la jornada laboral capitalista y la explotación? Cuando los trabajadores laboran para el capital, cobran un salario que les permite comprar una cantidad determinada de mercancías. ¿Cuánto es este salario? El nivel de los salarios no ha tenido nada de automático sino que se ha determinado a través de las luchas de los trabajadores contra el capital.

(...) Sin embargo, bajo el capitalismo, los trabajadores no laboran solamente las horas del trabajo necesario. No, el capitalista puede exigir que trabajen más horas porque, para poder sobrevivir, les ha obligado a vender su capacidad de trabajo. La diferencia ente sus horas de trabajo necesario y el total de horas que trabajan los trabajadores para el capitalista constituye el trabajo excedente – y es en ultima instancia, la fuente de las ganancias del capital. Es decir, las ganancias de los capitalistas se basa en la diferencia entre la jornada laboral y el trabajo necesario: se basan en el trabajo excedente, el trabajo no pagado, es decir, la explotación.

(...) Primero, ¿que entendemos por socialismo? La meta de los socialistas desde siempre ha sido crear una sociedad que permitiría el pleno desarrollo del potencial humano. Nunca se concibió como una sociedad en donde algunas personas pueden desarrollar sus capacidades y otras no lo pueden hacer. Esto es lo que quería decir Marx cuando declaró claramente que la meta es “una asociación donde el libre desarrollo de cada una depende del libre desarrollo de todos”.

(...) Tal como destacó Marx, a diferencia de una sociedad capitalista, donde los trabajadores existen para satisfacer la necesidad” del capital de expandirse, en una sociedad socialista la riqueza que los trabajadores han producido “existe para satisfacer la necesidad del trabajador de desarrollarse”. Ahora bien, ¿cómo es la naturaleza de la jornada laboral en una sociedad que se orienta a asegurar el desarrollo integral?

Lea todo el texto presentado por Michael A. Lebowitz como un comentario inicial para la discusión en el evento “Mesa redonda sobre la reducción de la jornada laboral” que tuvo lugar en el Centro Internacional Miranda el 24 de abril del 2008 aquí

Entrevista a Anwar Shaikh: “La mejor alternativa es un Estado creando puestos de trabajo”

"La teoría económica dominante está en quiebra”, sentenció el profesor Anwar Shaikh, considerado uno de los economistas marxistas más importantes en la actualidad. El economista, que no confía en el FMI para liderar y coordinar políticas globales para salir de la crisis, consideró que los planes del gobierno de Estados Unidos deberían apuntar a la creación directa de empleo.

Lea toda la entrevista realizada el 20 de marzo de este año aquí

The Political and Analytical Diversions of ‘Financial Regulation’

The only thing governments seem to be doling out in greater amounts than bailouts to private banks these days are promises for all sorts of ‘financial regulation’. The EU recently promised sweeping financial regulation. Gordon Brown insists it must be international, while the Obama administration promises it will be wide-ranging and strict.

My first problem with these promises is not simply that the horses bolted long ago. It is that those now calling for doors to be shut are the same political forces that only yesterday sang the virtues of open barns and assured us that competition would ensure horses always came back. That in itself should give pause and good reason to question the motivations behind these proposals.

But my bigger problem is the implicit presumption that the current financial crisis is simply the result of a lack of effective (sweeping, international or wide-ranging) regulation, with little to no serious relationship to the underlying economic and social trends of recent years. This is not only plain wrong, but also politically diversionary.

Analytically, this presumption mirrors the weaknesses of mainstream economic theory. First there were perfect markets, financial or otherwise, and they would lead to socially efficient outcomes. Then came ‘imperfections’, typically caused by ‘informational’ or other micro-level problems with transactions, which gave rise to conflicts of interest, potential misallocations of capital and crises. Virtue lies in deducing the contracts, ‘institutions’ and state regulation that can ameliorate these microeconomic conflicts, align incentives, and help earthly markets become more perfect.

This scheme not only leaves out the destructive endogenous tendencies of financial markets towards instability, but also abstracts from the historical, social, economic and political processes that condition the formulation, enforcement and avoidance of regulation. There is no ‘optimal regulation’ that applies equally to all periods and benefits the interests of all social groups. Financial regulation is an important but nevertheless secondary element of broader economic and political regimes. It is only ‘optimal’ in relation to specific socio-political interests.

Lea toda la opinión de Paulo dos Santos aquí que aparece en un interesante blog llamado "Political Finance" cuyo propósito definido en su página de inicio es "contribuir con ideas que puedan transformar el sistema moneatario y financiero en favor de los intereses de los trabajadores. Los contribuyentes a este blog son críticos de los mecanismos financieros privados e individuales y ven favorablemente el fortalecimiento de la provisión pública y colectiva de éstos (...) "Political Finance" es igualmente relevante para todas las organizaciones políticas interesadas en desarrollar trabajos sobre la economía capitalista."

El Síndrome de Sísifo: estancamiento, financiarización y crisis en Estados Unidos

(...) El mensaje esencial del artículo estriba en que la naturaleza de la catástrofe actual consiste en una crisis del preponderante modelo de financiarización, la cual hunde sus raíces más profundas en las deficiencias estructurales de la economíareal norteamericana y del sistema monetario y financiero internacional global. Por lo tanto, la crisis de las hipotecas subprime y el carrusel de activos tóxicos implicados son la consecuencia -no la causa- de un prolongado proceso acumulativo de: estancamiento productivo; financiarización; tremebundos desequilibrios sectoriales (real y financiero); deflación de deuda; acelerada concentración de la riqueza y del ingreso y, last but not least, regulación favorable al capital financiero especulativo.

(...) Tres son las causas fundamentales que impelen a la economía estadounidense por el derrotero infausto de recurrentes y abruptos ciclos boom-bust desde hace aproximadamente 30-40 años. Primero, el estancamiento estructural del sector real. Segundo, la financiarización de la economía. Tercero, la desregulación y re-regulación a favor del capital financiero.

Lea aquí todo el excelente artículo del Dr. Ignacio Perrotini publicado en Economía Informa.

The Crisis and the Consolidation of Class Power

Does this crisis signal the end of neo-liberalism? My answer is that it depends what you mean by neo-liberalism. My interpretation is that it’s a class project, masked by a lot of neo-liberal rhetoric about individual freedom, liberty, personal responsibility, privatisation and the free market. These were means, however, towards the restoration and consolidation of class power, and that neo-liberal project has been fairly successful.

One of the basic principles that was set up in the 1970s was that state power should protect financial institutions at all costs. This is the principle that was worked out in New York City crisis in the mid-1970s, and was first defined internationally when Mexico threatened to go bankrupt in 1982.

(...) A new state financial architecture is required. I don’t think that all existing institutions like the Bank of International Settlements and even the IMF should be abolished; I think we will need them but they have to be revolutionarily transformed. The big question is who will control them and what their architecture will be. We will need people, experts with some sort of understanding of how those institutions do work and can work. And this is very dangerous because, as we can see right now, when the state looks to see who can understand what is going on in Wall Street, they think only insiders can.

(...) There are a lot of possibilities the left should be paying attention to - this is a real opportunity. But it is where I have a problem with some Marxists who seem to think, ‘yes! It’s a crisis; the contradictions of capitalism will now be solved somehow!’ This is not a moment for triumphalism, this is a moment for problematising. First of all I think there are problems with the way Marx set up those problems. Marxists are not very good at understanding the state financial complex or urbanisation - they are terrific at understanding some other things. But now we have to rethink our theoretical posture and political possibilities.So thee is a lot of theoretical re-thinking that is needed as well as practical action.

Lea todo este buen texto de David Harvey aquí. Se recomienda además, revisar más profundamente el excelente blog de este magnífico autor.

Cuentos de hadas sobre la crisis

La interpretación más difundida sobre la crisis es que la codicia y la desregulación financiera generaron una burbuja especulativa. Cuando cayeron los precios de los bienes raíces, la burbuja reventó. En este proceso, los consumidores se tiraron tremenda borrachera de consumo y la codicia de los bancos estadunidenses llevó a otorgar hipotecas a personas que no eran sujetos de crédito. Los activos tóxicos contaminaron bancos, corporativos y fondos de inversión en todo el mundo. Eso congeló el crédito interbancario, colapsó la demanda y vino la recesión.

Este cuento tiene la ventaja de ser conciso y claro. Su defecto no es que sea falso, sino superficial. Se necesita un diagnóstico más serio sobre la naturaleza de la crisis. De lo contrario no hay garantía de que la medicina funcione y hasta puede estar contraindicada.

(...)La tendencia al sobrendeudamiento, o la propensión a la especulación, no se resuelven con inyecciones astronómicas de dólares a la economía. Desde esta perspectiva, el problema del paquete de rescate bancario de la administración de Bush no es que sea insuficiente, o siquiera que no impuso condicionamientos a los bancos. No, el problema es que es algo así como echar gasolina al fuego.

Hoy la prioridad en Estados Unidos está en la solución de los problemas de la economía real, no en los del sector financiero. Es crucial detener el deterioro salarial y eso pasa por reorganizar todo el modelo económico, redefiniendo la política monetaria y reorganizando la política fiscal para ejecutar un gasto público comprometido con prioridades sociales. Será necesario también abrir nuevos canales de participación pública en las estructuras de gobierno, inventar nuevas formas de control social de los recursos productivos y democratizar el proceso de trabajo.

Lea la opinión de Alejandro Nadal publicada en La Jornada aquí

"La crisis financiera marca el fin de un modelo cultural cuya doctrina es el fundamentalismo del libre mercado"

La crisis financiera actual representa también la crisis de un modelo cultural que tiene como principal doctrina al fundamentalismo del libre mercado, aseguró en entrevista Noam Chomsky calificado como el intelectual más influyente del planeta por las revistas Foreign Policy y Prospect Magazine en 2005.

"Donde la liberación financiera ha tenido lugar, a menudo resulta ser desastrosa, un hecho que debe ser suficientemente familiar en América Latina", dijo el lingüista y profesor emérito del Instituto Tecnológico de Massachusetts.

"Este modelo intelectual ha sufrido un duro golpe. Ha sido modificado radicalmente por la intervención del Estado, el mismo tipo de intervención que ha sido prohibida para los países pobres. El modelo será objeto de nuevas modificaciones de acuerdo a los intereses de los centros de poder económico que en gran medida controlan la política estatal".

Lea la entrevista realizada a Noam Chomsky aquí

De la “U” a la “Z”

La mayoría de las interpretaciones sobre el colapso financiero que se inició en octubre insisten, de una u otra manera, en verlo como la parálisis de un sistema que a mediano o a largo plazo se habrá de recuperar para seguir funcionando grosso modo como lo había hecho hasta hace poco. ¿Qué tan largo es hoy el “largo plazo”?

(...) Todas o casi todas estas “interpretaciones” –actos de fe, sería un término más preciso– coinciden en que, para impulsar el come back, el “Estado” habrá de ocupar el lugar que le fue negado desde los años 80 en el ámbito de la regulación, las inversiones públicas y las políticas contra el desempleo. Es realmente jocoso observar a un Sarkozy o un Berlusconi, o su copia muy enclenque y desmejorada en Germán Martínez, hablar, como si se hubieran cambiado simplemente de camiseta, de la necesidad de un “Estado fuerte” y una “conciencia de la regulación” para garantizar el bienestar de la sociedad. Hace tan sólo unos meses, estas definiciones eran, en boca de esa misma facilidad retórica, conceptos anacrónicos, vestigios del pasado. Entre chiste y chiste, cuando se escucha al jefe ultra del panismo decir “Estado fuerte”, más vale precaver, pues uno lo imagina visualizando un régimen en el que él encarna la fuerza que suprime toda diversidad.

Lea toda la opinión de Ilán Semo publicada hoy en La Jornada aquí

Estado versus mercado: una visión no convencional

(...) Se nos ha dicho, que a través de más mercado y con la disminución de la participación del Estado, la economía tendrá mayor crecimiento de la productividad, y mayor crecimiento económico. Sin embargo, la asignación de recursos propiciada por el mercado no ha actuado a favor de la esfera productiva y del empleo, sino del sector financiero por ofrecer éste mejores condiciones de rentabilidad, por lo que el crecimiento configurado ha sido menor al que se generó cuando el Estado tenía mayor participación en la actividad económica. Así de 1960 a 1981 la economía tuvo un crecimiento de 6.8% promedio anual, a diferencia del crecimiento de 2.3% promedio anual manifestado de 1982 al 2004. Cabe señalar que ningún país se ha desarrollado solo con libre mercado.

(...) En el contexto de liberalización económica, el Estado no puede instrumentar políticas anti-cíclicas a favor del crecimiento, ante el temor de que ello resulte inflacionario y desestabilice el tipo de cambio y afecte al capital financiero internacional.

(...) Al estar el mercado reemplazando al Estado de los sectores estratégicos, y en infraestructura, los re-funcionaliza en torno al comportamiento de la ganancia, terminando ello con la política de subsidios y de economías públicas que se realizaban a favor del sector productivo nacional.

Lea todo el artículo de Arturo Huerta aquí

World econony "weakest since 30s"

The United Nations says the world economy faces its worst downturn since the Great Depression.
Rob Vos, chief economist of the UN Secretariat said. "Day by day, we are getting closer to the pessimistic scenario".
(...) The UN's World Economic Situation and Prospects 2009 report gives three forecasts for growth next year - a baseline forecast of 1% growth, a pessimistic scenario of a 0.4% contraction and an optimistic scenario of 1.6% growth. This compares with growth of 2.5% in 2008 and 3.8% in 2007.

Lea el resumen de la BBC del reporte de la ONU aquí